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Abstract
Research in the literature shows that initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stocks are systematically
priced at a discount to their subsequent initial trading price. The large underpricing magnitude in the
Chinese IPO market has attracted much attention. We consider three hypotheses that may explain the IPO
underpricing in China. These are the winner’s curse hypothesis, the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis and the
signaling hypothesis. Among these hypotheses, the winner’s curse hypothesis has not been tested in the
Chinese market. Using IPO data for online fixed-price offerings from November 1995 to December 1998,
our results show that the winner’s curse hypothesis is the main reason for the high IPO underpricing in
China. The signaling hypothesis is not empirically supported in the Chinese market during the sample
period.
D 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: G15; G20
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1. Introduction
Research in the literature shows that initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stocks are
systematically priced at a discount to their subsequent trading price. The large underpricing
magnitude in the Chinese IPO market has attracted much attention. Mok and Hui (1998) report
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an underpricing of 289% for a sample of 87 Shanghai IPOs listed from 1990 to 1993.1 Su and
Fleisher (1999) find the underpricing level to be as high as 948.6% for A-share IPOs before
1996. More updated reports by Tian (2003) and Chen, Firth, and Kim (2004) find an average
initial return of 267% for the IPOs from 1991 to 2000 and 145% for IPOs from 1992 to 1997,
respectively. These reported levels of underpricing in the Chinese market are much higher than
the average level of 60% in other emerging markets (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001).
IPO underpricing may be explained by some classical models such as asymmetric information,
institutional explanations, and ownership and control. Previous studies byMok andHui (1998), Su
and Fleisher (1999), Chau, Ciccotello, and Grant (1999), and Chen et al. (2004) explore reasons for
the high IPO underpricing in China. This paper contributes to the literature by examining
empirically IPO underpricing in China in light of the classical models. We consider three
hypotheses that may explain the IPO underpricing in China. These are the winner’s curse
hypothesis (Rock, 1986), the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis (Ritter, 1984; Beatty & Ritter, 1986)
and the signaling hypothesis (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt & Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989,
1996). Among these hypotheses, the winner’s curse hypothesis has not been tested in the Chinese
market. The ex ante uncertainty hypothesis was tested byMok and Hui (1998) using one proxy for
ex ante uncertainty, i.e., the inverse of new funds raised. In this paper, we do a robust investigation
using several proxies to test the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis. In examining the signaling
hypothesis, we use an improved methodology (see the details in Section 3.3) to test four key
empirical implications of the model, three of which have been examined in Su and Fleisher
(1999). We report conclusions different from those of Su and Fleisher (1999). Our data cover the
period November 1995 to December 1998 for online fixed-price IPOs. We find that the winner’s
curse hypothesis is the main reason for the high IPO underpricing in China. On the other hand,
the signaling hypothesis is not supported in the Chinese market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a survey on the Chinese
primary market and discusses possible IPO underpricing hypotheses. Section 3 formulates the
hypotheses to be examined and the methodology adopted. Section 4 describes the data and
reports the empirical results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2. The Chinese primary market
2.1. Features of the Chinese primary market
IPO decisions in China are made on the basis of political considerations. The Chinese
authorities invite enterprises to apply for listing annually and make selections based on certain
criteria (Yau & Steele, 2000). The offering mechanisms have gone through several stages of
reforms. The most commonly used method after 1995 is the online fixed-price offering method,
in which investors bid for fixed quantities, with pro-rata allocation in the event of
oversubscription. Investors need to pay a full subscription deposit, with repayment for
1 Underpricing is defined as the pricing of an IPO at less than its market value. A possible measure of the degree of
underpricing is (MVP0)/MV, where P0 is the offer price and MV is the firm’s per-share market value on the offering
date. Since MV is unknown on the offering date, many researchers use the raw initial return, ( P1P0)/P0, where P1 is
the first-day closing price, as a measure of underpricing. In the exposition in this paper, we shall adopt the use of the raw
initial return, as well as the market-adjusted initial return (see Section 4 for the definition), as measures of IPO
underpricing.
T. Yu, Y.K. Tse / China Economic Review 17 (2006) 363–382364
unsuccessful applications around 1 week after subscription. It has become the major offering
method from 1996 to 2002.2
The offer price in the online fixed-price offering is set to the after-tax profits per share
multiplied by a price-earning ratio (PE), which is fixed in relation to the price-earning ratios of
listed companies in the same locality and industry. However, The PE ratio changes in accordance
with the guidance of the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission). The CSRC imposed
a PE ratio ceiling on all companies, regardless of the firm’s characteristics and growth potential.
Moreover, the ceiling changed over time. Before 1999, the ceiling was fixed at 15. In January
1999, the ceiling was raised to as high as 50. In 2002, however, a ceiling of 20 was re-imposed.
In case of oversubscription, investors are allocated shares by balloting. The same ballot ratio is
used regardless of the number of shares investors applied for.
Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) are frequently observed amongChinese issuers and account for
a substantial portion of shares issued. About 91% of the Chinese firms that went public before 1 July
1994 issued seasoned equities before 1 January 1996 (Su&Fleisher, 1999). Another characteristic of
the Chinese stock market is that the accounting report and market regulatory system in China are
relatively primitive and incomplete (Aharony, Lee, & Wong 2000; Xiang, 1998). Also, the auditing
standards are generally perceived to be low. There is far less corporate disclosure in China than in the
developed markets. This causes difficulties for individual investors to evaluate an IPO before
investing, thus creating big ex ante uncertainty about the issuing firm’s value.
2.2. Selected studies on Chinese IPO underpricing
Table 1 presents a summary of some studies on the underpricing of the Chinese IPO market.
These studies report that the mean initial returns range from 127% to 949% and provide a number of
determinants for underpricing, including time gap, offering size and issuer’s fractional ownership.
Mok and Hui (1998) find that the high equity retention by the state, a long time lag between offering
and listing, and ex ante risk of new issues are the key determinants of IPO underpricing. Su and
Fleisher (1999) examine the signaling model comprehensively and find that the Chinese IPO
underpricing is a strategy for firms to signal their value to investors. They also investigate the effects
of the offeringmechanism on IPO underpricing. It is found that IPO underpricing is the largest under
the lottery system with a fixed number of lottery forms and is the smallest under the auction
mechanism. A recent study by Tian (2003) argues that the listing quota and pricing caps imposed by
the government aremajor determinants of IPO underpricing. Chen et al. (2004) identify three reasons
for the Chinese A-share IPO underpricing. First, firms with a long delay between the issue of the IPO
shares and the subsequent listing price the IPO cheaply. Second, firms making SEOs in the first 2
years after the initial listing set a lower price for IPO. Third,when state or quasi-state share ownership
is high, agency costs increase and liquidity decreases. Therefore, greater underpricing is required to
compensate investors for their increased risk exposure.
2.3. Possible explanations for Chinese IPO underpricing
Researchers have produced a large theoretical and empirical literature to explain why firms
are floated at a low price. Jenkinson and Ljunqvist (2001) sum up many models on IPO
2 China has been experimentingwith different offeringmethods, such as book building and auction offering.While the effects
of different offeringmethods could be examined using the dummy-variable technique,we shall not pursue this investigation. As
the data for other offering methods in our sample period are scarce, we decide to focus on online fixed-price issues.
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Table 1
Selected studies of the Chinese IPO underpricing
Papers Sample
size
Sample
period
Average initial
return (%)
Findings pertaining to the explanations of the IPO
underpricing
Mok and Hui
(1998)
87 1990–1993 289 The high equity retention by the state, a long time lag
between offering and listing and ex ante risk of new
issues were the key determinants of the underpricing.
Kim, Rui, and
Xu (1998)
45 1993 594 IPOs for which a larger percentage of total shares are
sold to individual investors are more underpriced and
IPOs of firms that are expected to have larger increases
in profitability are less underpriced. This is consistent
with the political persuasion hypothesis.
Su and Fleisher
(1999)
101 1987–1995 949 The signaling hypothesis explains the pattern of
underpricing behavior rather well. In examining the
effect of the offering mechanism on IPO underpricing,
they find underpricing to be the largest under the lottery
system with a fixed number of lottery forms and is the
smallest under the auction mechanism.
Chau et al.
(1999)
102 1990–1993 546 Investors in previously centrally planned economies
view agency costs as a consideration in investment.
Initial returns are smaller when the government
retains a large proportion of ownership and initial
returns are negatively related to firm size. Investors
rely on insider ownership to reduce agency costs.
Chen, Firth, and
Kim (2000)
277 1992–1995 350 The state underprices to ensure future seasoned equity
issues to be successful. The long time lag from the
offering date to the first trading date explains
the high underpricing. A-share IPOs that subsequently
make rights issues are significantly more underpriced.
Chi and Padgett
(2002)
340 1996–1997 127 The quota system for new issues is the main reason
for the underpricing.
Chen et al.
(2004)
701 1992–1997 145 Firms with a long delay between the issue of IPO
shares and the subsequent listing of those shares price
the IPO cheaply. Firms that make seasoned equity
offerings (SEOs) in the first 2 years after the initial
listing set a lower price for IPO. When state or
quasi-state share ownership is high, agency costs
increase and liquidity decreases. Therefore, greater
underpricing is required to compensate investors for
their increased risk exposure.
Tian (2003) 1124 1991–2000 267 The listing quota and pricing caps imposed by the
government account for more than half of the severe
underpricing.
Information on the quality of the firm causes IPO
underpricing, but it is not a major determinant.
Besides the effects of the financial regulations,
Chinese-specific investment risks also contribute
to severe underpricing. The long time lag from the
IPO date to the first trading date causes the
underpricing.
This table describes only studies on the Chinese IPO underpricing. Works on other aspects of the Chinese stock market
such as the long-term IPO after-market performance, the development of China’s privatization program, the price
behavior of listed companies, or the relationships between company value and accounting earnings and book values are
not included. Among the papers listed, only findings relevant to IPO underpricing are summarized.
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underpricing, which may be divided into three categories: asymmetric information, institutional
explanation, and ownership and control. In this paper we focus on three possible explanations for
the Chinese IPO market under the asymmetric information category, namely, Rock’s (1986)
winner’s curse hypothesis, ex ante uncertainty hypothesis and signaling hypothesis. Due to the
specific institutional set-up in the Chinese market, other hypotheses, such as the ownership and
control, and principal–agent hypotheses, are not applicable.
Rock’s winner’s curse hypothesis has been examined only in countries where there are data
on allocation rates (Amihud, Hauser, & Kirsh, 2003; Keloharju, 1993; Koh & Walter, 1989;
Levis, 1990). In the Chinese market, the allocation-rate data are available, and all applications of
different sizes have equal probability of being accepted. This feature enables us to examine the
winner’s curse hypothesis in the Chinese market. Furthermore, the fact that the probability of
successful application is independent of the subscription amount makes the test for the winner’s
curse hypothesis robust to the subscription strategies assumed.
Due to the high degree of investor uncertainty in the Chinese market, there may be incentives
for good-quality issuers to underprice in order to signal their value. Moreover, frequent SEOs
among Chinese issuers suggest that signaling may be a good explanation for underpricing. Also,
the weakness in disclosure and auditing standards may create a high degree of investor
uncertainty. Thus, ex ante uncertainty could be a reason for the IPO underpricing. If a positive
relation between ex ante uncertainty and underpricing exists, it may be explained by the winner’s
curse model as well as the signaling hypothesis.
3. Hypotheses and methodology
3.1. Winner’s curse
Rock’s (1986) asymmetric information model assumes that there are two groups of potential
investors in the IPO markets: dinformedT and duninformedT investors. Informed investors bid
only for attractively priced IPOs; duninformedT investors apply for all new issue coming onto the
market indiscriminately. Thus, uninformed investors face competition for good shares, but have
a higher probability of obtaining bad shares due to the rationing of oversubscribed offerings.
Rock argued that the bias in rationing produces an equilibrium offer price with a discount
sufficient to attract uninformed investors. Implicit in the winner’s curse hypothesis is the notion
that when adjusted for rationing and risk, uninformed investors’ initial returns should be on
average equal to the riskless rate, which is just enough to ensure their continued participation in
the market. Thus, we consider the following hypothesis:
H1. After ration-adjustment, uninformed investors earn the riskless rate.
We assume that uninformed investors subscribe a fixed amount of shares for each and every
IPO. Thus, their allocation-weighted initial return, AWIR, is given by3
AWIR ¼ P1  P0
P0
 
BALLOT I1  I0
I0
 
ð1Þ
3 In the fixed-price offering, unsuccessful application deposits are refunded around 1 week after the IPO subscription
date. However, since the interest rate is extremely low in the Chinese market (average one-week interest rate in the study
period is 0.039%) and there are few other investment opportunities, we treat the application deposit as frozen until the
first trading date.
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where P1 is the closing price on the first day of trading, P0 is the IPO offer price, BALLOT is the
ballot ratio, and (I1 I0)/I0 is the A-share composite index return from the IPO date to the first
trading date. I1 is the closing price of the A-share composite index on the first trading date and I0
is the closing price of the A-share composite index on the IPO date. Hypothesis H1 states that
AWIR is approximately equal to the riskless rate of interest.
3.2. Ex ante uncertainty
An empirical implication of the winner’s curse hypothesis, as pointed out by Ritter (1984)
and formalized in Beatty and Ritter (1986), is that underpricing should increase with ex ante
uncertainty surrounding an issue. However, while ex ante uncertainty aggravates the winner’s
curse problem it also has a re-enforcement effect on the signaling hypothesis, as pointed out in
Section 2. Therefore, we shall test the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis separately.
Researchers have used the variance of the after-market returns of IPOs (Clarkson & Merkley,
1994; Ritter, 1984, 1987), the age of the firm at the time of offering (Ritter, 1984, 1991;
Megginson & Weiss, 1991), the offer size (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; McGuinness, 1992) and the
underwriter’s reputation (Carter & Manaster, 1990; James & Wier, 1990; Johnson & Miller,
1988) as proxies for measuring the ex ante uncertainty of the IPOs. In this study, we do not use
underwriter’s reputation as a proxy because the Chinese A-share issues are underwritten by
domestic state-owned securities companies, with no international reputations. Previous studies
(Chen et al., 2004; Wu, 2001) also suggest that underwriters’ reputation is insignificant in
explaining the Chinese IPO underpricing. For the other three proxies stated above, we postulate
that uncertainty is positively related to the variance of the after-market returns of the IPOs and
negatively related to the age of the issuing firms and the offering size. As higher uncertainty
induces higher underpricing, we consider following hypotheses:
H2. The standard deviation of the after-market returns of the IPOs is positively related to IPO
underpricing.
H3. The offer size of the firm is inversely related to IPO underpricing.
H4. The age of the firm is inversely related to IPO underpricing.
We use multiple linear regression model to examine the explanatory power of ex ante
uncertainty, with controls for other determinants of IPO underpricing. The dependent variable is
the market-adjusted initial return. The proxies for ex ante uncertainty are SD, AGE and IPOSZ,
where SD is the standard deviation of returns over days 1 to 100 after IPO, AGE is the age of a
firm in years from the establishment date to the date of IPO, and IPOSZ is the number of shares
offered at the IPO times the IPO offer price.
Other factors that may affect the initial returns are included in the regression. We consider the
market return before the IPO. There has been overwhelming evidence that underpricing is higher in
buoyant stock markets (Davis & Yeomans, 1976 (UK); Reilly, 1977 (USA); and McGuinness,
1992 (Hong Kong)). To test whether Chinese IPOs are more heavily underpriced when the market
is performing well, we use BFMARTN, the percentage change in the A-share composite index 3
months prior to the issue, as an explanatory variable. Another control variable is the issuers’
fractional ownership. Mok and Hui (1998) argue that in an emerging market with high information
asymmetry, the domestic investors interpret a high percentage of equity retention by the state as
confidence in the firm. Thus, high equity retention by the state lowers the ex ante uncertainty. On
the contrary, Chen et al. (2004) found that state and legal entity ownership is positively related to
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initial return. They argue that high state and legal entity ownership is perceived as increasing
agency cost for private shareholders. To investigate this, we use OWNSHP, which is the proportion
of shares owned by the government and legal entities, as an explanatory variable. The time gap
elapsed between the IPO date and the first trading date may also affect the level of ex ante
uncertainty. Chowdry and Sherman (1996) demonstrate that a longer lag between the fixing of the
offer price and the beginning of trading results in higher ex ante uncertainty and IPO underpricing.
Mok andHui (1998), Su and Fleisher (1999), and Chen et al. (2004) report large time gaps between
offering and listing in the Chinese market. Therefore, we add the time lag from the IPO date to the
first trading date, LAG, as an independent variable. Other control variables include year dummies
(due to the differences in PE ceilings), industry dummies and the exchange dummy. Thus, we
consider the following regression:
IR ¼ b0 þ b1SDþ b2lnAGEþ b3lnIPOSZþ b4BFMARTN þ b5OWNSHPþ b6LAG
þ b7Y96þb8Y97þb9IN2þb10IN3þ b11IN4þ b12IN6þ b13STKCDSHþ e ð2Þ
where the last seven explanatory variables are dummy variables defined as follows:
Year Y96 equals to 1 for IPOs in 1996 (including 1 IPO in November and 1 in December
1995), Y97 are IPOs in 1997, and Y98 are IPOs in 1998.
Industry IN2 utilities, IN3 properties, IN4 conglomerates, IN5 industry, IN6 commerce
Exchange STKCDSH is a dummy for IPOs listed on the SHSE; STKCDSZ is a dummy for
IPOs listed on the SZSE.
If H2, H3, and H4 hold, we expect b1 to be positive, and b2 and b3 to be negative. If the ex
ante uncertainty hypothesis stands, we also expect positive b4 and b6. However, as the works of
Mok and Hui (1998) and Chen et al. (2004) show, the sign for b5 is ambiguous.
3.3. Signaling
The signaling model assumes that the issuer has better information on issue value than the
underwriters or investors. If the issuing firm is better informed about the present value and the
risk of its future cash flows than the investors or underwriters, underpricing may become a
means of convincing potential buyers of the btrueQ high value of the firm, i.e., underpricing is a
signal for firm quality. Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch
(1989, 1996) propose theories of underpricing signaling. They hypothesize that underpricing
allows bgoodQ firms to distinguish themselves from bbadQ firms and to improve the terms of
future external financing. Under this assumption, good-quality issuers are assumed to maximize
the expected proceeds in a two-stage sale. They sell a fraction of the firm at flotation and the
remainder in a SEO. Therefore, the signaling model leads to the following empirical predictions:
H5. Firms with more underpriced IPOs are more likely to issue seasoned equity than firms with
less underpriced IPOs.
H6. Firms with more underpriced IPOs are likely to issue seasoned equity more promptly than
firms with less underpriced IPOs.
The signaling hypothesis also implies empirically a positive association between underpricing
and the success of the SEO. The success of SEO can be measured in terms of the SEO size
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relative to its IPO size and the market reaction to the seasoned issue. This leads to the following
hypotheses:
H7. Firms with more underpriced IPOs are likely to issue larger amount of seasoned equity than
firms with less underpriced IPOs.
H8. Firms with more underpriced IPOs are likely to experience a less unfavorable price reaction
to SEO announcement than firms with less underpriced IPOs.
Hypothesis H8 follows from the notion that firms with higher IPO underpricing are more
likely to issue seasoned equity. There is, however, an alternative explanation for the existence of
the above relations between IPO underpricing and SEO activity. In particular, the market feedback
hypothesis posits that the market is better informed than the issuer. Hence, a high return on the
IPO date implies that the issuer has underestimated the marginal return to the project. The issuer
uses this information and increases the scale of the project by raising additional capital through
seasoned offerings. To explore whether the relations between IPO underpricing and SEO activity
can be explained by the market feedback hypothesis, we examine whether the returns in 400
trading days after the IPOs, AFTRTN, are related to subsequent offerings. We choose a 400-day
post-IPO window to measure the after-market returns because the cross-sectional standard
deviation of the after-market returns in the 400-day window is about the same as the cross-
sectional standard deviation of the IPO date returns, which suggests that the same amount of
information is revealed to the market during these two periods. This follows from the suggestion
by Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993). We test H5 using the following logit model:
ln Pseo= 1 pseoð Þ½  ¼ b0 þ b1IRþ b2AFTRTNþ b3lnIPOSZ þ b4Y96þ b5Y97
þ b6IN2þ b7IN3þ b8IN4þ b9IN6þ b10STKCDSHþ e ð3Þ
where Pseo is the probability that a firm issues seasoned equity after the initial offering. The first
two independent variables are market-adjusted initial return (underpricing) and the after-market
abnormal return over the period from trading day 1 to trading day 400 after the IPO date. The
after-market abnormal return is the market-adjusted return over the same period. Since firms with
a small IPO size are more likely to come to seasoned equity offering, we include the natural
logarithm of the IPO size as an additional explanatory variable. Finally, we also control for
potential differences in SEO activity across years, industries and exchanges. We expect a positive
b1 if H5 holds and a positive b2 if the market feedback hypothesis holds.
To examine the relationship between the time elapsed between IPO and SEO, TIMESEO, and
IPO underpricing, we use a tobit model with right censoring. For firms with no SEO from 1996
to 2001, we take their re-issuance time as infinity. For firms with their first SEO during that
period, the maximum time elapsed between IPO and SEO is 1394 days. Therefore, we take
ln(1400) as the right censoring value.4 Thus, we consider the following model:
lnTIMESEO
¼ b0 þ b1IRþ b2AFTRTNþ b3lnIPOSZþ b4Y96þ b5Y97þ b6IN2þ b7IN3þ b8IN4þ b9IN6þ b10STKCDSHþ e if RHSNln1400
l otherwise

ð4Þ
We expect a negative b1 if H6 holds and a negative b2 if the market feedback hypothesis
holds.
4 Su and Fleisher (1999) use a tobit model to test for the same hypothesis. For IPOs with no seasoned equity offerings,
they take TIMESEO as zero and use a left censoring test.
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To test H7, we use a tobit model similar to that in Jegadeesh et al. (1993). The tobit model
specifies the relation between the relative size of seasoned offering and the explanatory variables
as follows:
SEOSZ=IPOSZ ¼ b0þb1IRþb2AFTRTNþb3lnIPOSZþb4Y96þb5Y97þ b6IN2þb7IN3þb8IN4þ b9IN6þ b10STKCDSHþ e if RHSN0
0 otherwise

ð5Þ
where SEOSZ is the number of shares offered at the first SEO times the SEO price, and SEOSZ/
IPOSZ is the relative size of the SEO. The independent variables are the same as those in the
logit model. Similarly, we expect a positive b1 if H7 holds and a positive b2 if the market
feedback hypothesis holds.
To examine the excess return around the date when the firm announces its SEO, we estimate
the excess return, REACT, over the event days 1 through +4, where day 0 is the SEO
announcement date. REACT equals to [(P4P1)/P1] [(I4 I1)/I1], where P4 is the
fourth day closing price of the stock and I4 is the fourth day closing price of the corresponding
A-share composite index after the SEO announcement (the SEO announcement date is taken as
the publishing date of the SEO prospectus). P1 and I1 are the stock price and index price 1
day before the SEO announcement, respectively.
Moreover, we include the variable TIMESEO, which measures the number of days between
the IPO date and the SEO date. The longer the time between these events, the greater is the
amount of public information about the firm, thus reducing the uncertainty about the firm value.
Additional independent variables are SEOSZ/MKT, which is the SEO size over the stock market
value 1 day before the SEO announcement and SEOPRC/TRDPRC, which is the SEO price over
the closing price 1 day before the SEO announcement. These variables are included to control
for possible differences the market reacts to the SEO announcements that are not related to the
initial returns of their IPOs or their after-market returns. For firms with SEO, we estimate the
following regression to examine H8:
REACT ¼ b0 þ b1IRþ b2AFTRTNþ b3lnIPOSZ þ b4Y96þ b5Y97þ b6IN2
þ b7IN3þ b8IN4þ b9IN6þ b10STKCDSHþ b11lnTIMESEO
þ b12lnSEOSZþ b13SEOSZ=MKTþ b14SEOPRC=TRDPRCþ e ð6Þ
We expect a positive b1 if H8 holds and a positive b2 if the market feedback hypothesis holds.
4. Data and empirical results
4.1. Data
We examine all online fixed-price A-share IPOs in the period November 1995 to
December 1998. Financial institutions and close-end funds are excluded. Derrien and
Womach (2003) find that there is a difference in underpricing between fixed-price, book-
building and auction-offering mechanisms. Su and Fleisher (1999) also find that the offering
mechanism affects the IPO underpricing. In particular, IPO underpricing is the highest under
the lottery system with a fixed number of lottery forms and is the smallest under the auction
mechanism. To control for the effect of offering mechanism on underpricing, we choose to
study the online fixed-price offering which has become the most commonly used offering
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method in China since 1995. We exclude the IPOs after 1999 to maintain sufficient after-
market data for testing the signaling model. Thus, our sample period ends in 1998. This
helps to control for government intervention in the pricing of IPOs, since after 1998, there
was a policy change in the ceiling for the PE ratio.
The data come from several sources, including the trading database from GTA (Guo Tai
An Information Technology Co.), the IPO database from Haitong Securities and the
panorama network website (www.p5w.net). A sample of 343 IPOs are collected, representing
a broad spectrum of industries. Descriptive statistics are reported in panel A of Table 2. The
mean and median offering sizes of the IPOs (i.e., gross proceeds) are RMB 304 million and
RMB 220 million, respectively. The average proportion of shares retained by the state and
legal entities is 64.91%, indicating that the majority of the equities are non-negotiable
government shares and legal entities shares. The average age of the IPO firms is 3 years.
The mean PE ratio used in IPO pricing and the average offer price are 14.85 and 6.19,
respectively.
215 out of the 343 IPOs issue their first SEO in the period 1996–2001. In other words, over
60% of the sample of IPOs issue SEOs. All the 215 SEOs included in our study are rights offers
(SEOs to the existing shareholders). Public seasoned offering (SEOs to the general public
investors) are rarely found in China because public seasoned offerings are not permitted until
1997. Even after the restriction was lifted, very few firms used public offerings in their re-
issuances. Some characteristics of the SEO data are reported in panel B of Table 2. The average
SEO price is RMB 8.79 and the average SEO size is RMB 248.27 million. The mean and
minimum durations it takes from IPO to SEO are 805 days and 441 days, respectively.
To measure the level of IPO underpricing, we use the market-adjusted initial return, i.e., the
raw initial return after taking into account the overall market effect. The raw initial return
RAWIR is calculated as
RAWIR ¼ P1  P0ð Þ=P0
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of 343 IPOs in the 1996–1998 period and 215 SEOs in the period 1996–2001
Variable Number of
observations
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard
deviation
Skewness
Panel A IPO characteristics
IPOSZ (million RMB) 343 304.00 220.50 2625.00 33.00 310.00 3.60
OWNSHP 343 0.6491 0.6629 0.8499 0.2698 0.0973 0.8192
AGE (years) 343 3.06 2.03 40.99 0.10 3.27 6.08
PE 343 14.85 14.57 32.52 8.80 2.51 0.76
LAG (days) 343 32.43 21.00 377.00 9.00 35.09 6.02
P0 343 6.19 5.99 15.70 2.45 1.83 1.38
P1 343 13.71 12.74 53.57 4.41 6.01 1.90
BFMARRTN 343 0.1583 0.1076 0.8649 0.2859 0.2407 0.6655
AFTRTN 343 0.1482 0.0210 3.9045 3.0145 0.7575 1.3241
Panel B SEO characteristics
SEOSZ (million RMB) 215 248.27 188.10 1395.00 2.08 206.07 2.49
SEOPRC 215 8.79 8.00 26.00 3.30 3.50 1.60
TIMESEO (days) 215 805 805 1394 441 219.44 0.55
REACT 215 0.0109 0.0144 0.2672 0.1308 0.0472 1.2076
T. Yu, Y.K. Tse / China Economic Review 17 (2006) 363–382372
Market-adjusted initial return equals to RAWIR minus the A-share composite index return from
the IPO date to its first trading date.
IR ¼ RAWIR I1  I0ð Þ=I0
where I1 is the closing price of the SHSE A-share composite index or SZSE A-share composite
index on the first trading day of the new issue, and I0 is the closing price of the SHSE A-share
composite index or SZSE A-share composite index on the IPO date.
To examine a longer term IPO after-market performance, we calculate initial returns over 10
and 100 trading days after the IPO as
IR10 ¼ P10  P0ð Þ=P0  I10  I0ð Þ=I0
and
IR100 ¼ P100  P0ð Þ=P0  I100  I0ð Þ=I0:
Some summary statistics for the initial excess returns are presented in Table 3 and the
distribution of IR is depicted in Fig. 1. The average IR is positive and significant: the mean is
123.59% with t=27.00. Only 7 out of 343 IPOs have negative initial returns. Nearly 98% of the
IPOs have positive initial returns. The average 10-day and 100-day initial excess returns, IR10
and IR100, are 119.27% and 123.79%, respectively. These values are much lower than those
reported in previous studies, suggesting that the Chinese new issue market has improved in
efficiency. IR10 is slightly lower than IR, and IR100 is slightly higher than IR. Notably, the
mean initial return from day +1 to day +100 is not significantly different from zero
(mean=1.72%, t =0.93). If the price of a new issue at the opening of trade represents an
overreaction or speculative bubble rather than the true economic or fundamental price, we
should witness a significant decline in the stock return in the after-market. However, we do not
see a statistically significant difference between IR and IR100, which suggests that there is no
momentum effect in pricing. The correlation between IR and the subsequent initial returns from
Table 3
Initial returns in IPOs with adjustment for allocation
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation Skewness
Initial return
IR 1.2359 (27.00) 1.1123 8.2050 0.1211 0.8479 2.4129
IR10 1.1927 (26.38) 1.0619 5.6548 0.1886 0.8372 1.5264
IR100 1.2379 (25.07) 1.0192 5.4331 0.8410 0.9145 1.1342
Allocation-weighted initial return
AWIR 0.0033 (0.63) 0.0050 0.3652 0.3621 0.0955 0.1360
AWIR by IPO characteristics (IPO sample sorted into 4 quartiles by each characteristic)
IPO characteristic 4th quartile 3rd quartile 2nd quartile 1st quartile
IPOSZ 0.0108 (1.36) 0.0133 (1.26) 0.0084 (0.72) 0.0291 (2.82)
OWNSHP 0.0156 (1.76) 0.0028 (0.27) 0.0032 (0.28) 0.0034 (0.32)
AGE 0.0045 (0.52) 0.0409 (4.11) 0.0226 (1.97) 0.0099 (1.01)
PE 0.0062 (0.60) 0.0077 (0.83) 0.0058 (0.59) 0.0176 (1.55)
The figures in the parentheses are the t-statistics. For the last panel, IPO samples are sorted in increasing order of the IPO
characteristics. For example, 1st quartile of IPOSZ consists of 25% of the sample with the smallest IPO size.
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day +1 to day +100 is 0.114, indicating that the price of the IPO stocks adjusts efficiently after
the IPO. All three initial return distributions are positively skewed, reflecting the very high
returns obtained in a few cases.
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the initial returns and the PE ratios used in IPO
pricing by year and by stock exchange. There are only two observations in 1995 and we include
these into the data for 1996. The average initial returns in 1996, 1997 and 1998 are 95.87%,
144.96% and 130.57%, respectively. The significant differences in underpricing across years are
mainly due to the changes in the IPO pricing policy over time. Table 4 shows that the PE ratios
used in 1996 are significantly higher than those in 1997 and 1998.
4.2. Allocation and adverse selection
The allocation rate used in the Chinese IPO market is equal to the ratio of the number of
shares publicly offered in the IPO to the number of shares subscribed by investors. There is no
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Fig. 1. Distribution of initial excess returns in IPOs.
Table 4
Statistics of initial returns and PE ratios by year and by stock exchange
Years Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness
1996 (121) IR 0.96 0.95 3.37 0.12 0.90
PE 15.34 14.90 32.52 9.70 0.26
1997 (125) IR 1.45 1.29 4.64 0.01 1.46
PE 14.67 14.90 18.00 10.00 0.16
1998 (97) IR 1.31 1.13 8.20 0.05 3.25
PE 14.48 14.50 18.00 8.80 0.20
Shanghai (170) IR 1.20 1.11 4.31 0.12 1.05
PE 14.86 14.57 32.52 8.80 3.13
Shenzhen (173) IR 1.27 1.13 8.20 0.11 2.86
PE 14.84 14.57 27.96 11.35 0.59
The figures in the parentheses are the number of IPOs in that year or in that stock exchange.
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under-subscription in the sample. BALLOT denotes the ballot ratio. Some summary statistics of
BALLOT are presented in Table 5, and its distribution is depicted in Fig. 2.
The ballot ratio in most IPOs is extremely small due to the overwhelming oversubscription.
The overwhelming oversubscription is mainly caused by surplus demand for the limited supply
of shares. The distribution shows that the allocation rate in most IPOs (95%) is below 5% and
there are only a few cases with ballot ratio greater than that. The mean for BALLOT in our
sample is 2.18% and the median is much lower, 0.65%. The average allocation rate for
overpriced IPOs is 34%, which is much higher than that of the underpriced IPOs (1.51%). This is
consistent with the winner’s curse theory that the uninformed investors have a higher probability
of obtaining overpriced IPOs. However, this is weak evidence of the presence of winner’s curse
problem since we have only seven overpriced IPOs.
If H1 is true, the allocation-weighted initial returns minus the riskless rate should be
approximately zero. The statistics for AWIR are presented in Table 3. The mean of AWIR is
negative (0.33%), and is not statistically different from zero (t=0.63). This suggests that,
despite the seemingly high initial returns, uninformed IPO investors essentially break even. This
result confirms the major empirical implications of Rock’s theory. We thus conclude that
individual investors in China face the winner’s curse problem. To the best of our knowledge, this
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Fig. 2. Distribution of ballot ratios in IPOs.
Table 5
Allocation statistics (ballot ratios) of IPOs
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Observations
BALLOT 0.0218 0.0065 0.9540 0.0013 343
Ballot classified by initial return
For IRb0; Ballot 0.3432 0.0851 0.954 0.0057 7
For IRN0; Ballot 0.0151 0.0065 0.7315 0.0013 336
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is the first documented result of a test of the implications of the winner’s curse hypothesis using
adjusted (based on ballots) initial returns.
To further examine whether AWIR varies with the IPO characteristics we calculate AWIR
based on the IPO samples sorted by certain IPO characteristics. We consider four IPO
characteristics, namely, size (IPOSZ), ownership (OWNSHP), age (AGE) and price-earning ratio
(PE), and sort the IPO samples into quartiles based on these characteristics. The AWIR is then
calculated for each quartile. We observe that AWIR remains statistically insignificant for all
quartiles sorted by ownership and PE. Rather interestingly, IPOs in the first size-quartile have
statistically significant negative AWIR, while the AWIR of the other quartiles are not statistically
different from zero. We also report that the mean AWIR (t-statistic) for the IPOs in 1996, 1997
and 1998 are, respectively, 0.0420 (4.30), 0.0127 (1.72) and 0.0245 (3.07). This result may
also be due to the changing IPO size from 1996 to 1998. Specifically, the median IPO size
increased monotonically from 1996 to 1998. For the age of the IPO companies, the results are
ambiguous. AWIR is statistically significantly negative for the 3rd quartile (age of company
about 2–4 years) and statistically significantly positive for the 2nd quartile (age of company
about 1–2 years). Otherwise, AWIR is not significantly different from zero.
Why is the winner’s curse problem more serious in China than in other emerging markets?
Two characteristics of the Chinese market may explain this. First, in the Chinese stock market,
more than 90% of the investors are individuals who do not have sufficient access to information
on SOEs or do not have sufficient knowledge and experience in investing. To keep these
uninformed individual investors in the market, the government has to control the supply of IPOs
as well as their PE ceilings, which causes the underpricing of the IPOs (Chi & Padgett, 2005).
Second, the immature Chinese stock market has very low transparency compared to other
developed and developing markets. Ang and Ma (1999) find that the average analysts’ forecast
errors of the earnings of Chinese firms are around twice those of their control group, the Hong
Kong companies, and are also higher than those of several developed and developing Asia
Pacific countries. There is hardly any useful information about the IPO companies for individual
investors in China. Difficulties in getting useful information make the proportion of uninformed
investors larger than those of other countries. This deteriorates the winner’s curse problem in the
Chinese market.
4.3. Ex ante uncertainty
Table 6 presents the regression results for Eq. (2). Consistent with H2, the coefficient for the
standard deviation of the after-market returns is positive and strongly significant. The
coefficients for lnAGE and lnIPOSZ are both negative and significant, which supports the ex
ante uncertainty hypotheses H3 and H4, namely, the age and offer size of the issuing firm are
inversely related to IPO underpricing.
The coefficient of BFMARTN is positive and significant, which suggests that the IPOs are
more underpriced in hot market. This is consistent with previous studies. The coefficient of
OWNSHP is negative and significant. This shows that Chinese investors interpret high state and
legal entity retention as government support and business guaranty. In other words, investors’
confidence in the government guaranty dominates their worry over the agency cost. That is, high
equity retention lowers the ex ante uncertainty about firm value, thereby lowers the required
level of underpricing. The time lag between the IPO date and the first trading date is insignificant
in explaining IPO underpricing. In contrast to the results of Mok and Hui (1998), Su and Fleisher
(1999), and Chen et al. (2004), the time lag in our sample (after 1995) has been dramatically
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shortened, which removes previous uncertain factors caused by the long time lag.5 This also
shows that online fixed-price offering method is more efficient than previous methods. As a
result, time lag cannot explain the high IPO underpricing after 1995.
The negative and significant coefficient for the dummy variable Y96 shows that the IPOs
made in 1996 are less underpriced than the IPOs in 1998. This may be due to the changes of the
PE ceiling. There is no statistical difference in underpricing across industries. The IPO
underpricing in SHSE is significantly higher than that in SZSE. It is noted that many firms in
SZSE are joint ventures, while those listed in SHSE are mostly SOEs. As there is relatively more
disclosure and less uncertainty in joint venture firms, the IPOs listed on SZSE may be less
underpriced. The model explains 96.71% of the variability in initial returns of the sample of A-
share IPOs, which shows the strong explanatory power of ex ante uncertainty. This supports our
hypothesis that the high ex ante uncertainty in IPO value is the main reason for the high level of
IPO underpricing observed in the Chinese market.
4.4. Signaling
Table 7 presents the logit regression test for the relation between IPO underpricing and the
probability of seasoned equity issue (Eq. (3)). The coefficient (t-statistics) of IR is 0.07
(0.40). The coefficient of AFTRTN (t-statistics) is 0.86 (3.97). For H5, the signaling
hypothesis implies a positive and significant role of IPO initial return in explaining the
likelihood of issuing subsequent equity offerings. However, we find a negative and insignificant
coefficient for the initial returns. This suggests that the signaling hypothesis does not hold. Also,
the estimates show a strong relation between the after-market price appreciation and the
5 The average lag time in our sample is only 32 days, which is much shorter than the average of 260 days reported in Su
and Fleisher’s (1999) study and 259 days in Chen et al. (2004). The much shorter lag time from the IPO date to the first
listing date in our sample shows that the online fixed-pricing offering method is more efficient than previously used
offering methods.
Table 6
OLS regression analysis for ex ante uncertainty
Dependent variable IR Model
Coefficient t statistics
Explanatory variables Constant 0.83 2.64a
SD 9.90 78.61a
LNAGE 0.03 3.23a
LNIPOSZ 0.03 2.23b
BFMARRTN 0.10 2.45b
OWNSHP 0.29 2.44b
LAG 0.00 0.90
Y96 0.19 6.56a
Y97 0.01 0.39
IN2 0.00 0.09
IN3 0.00 0.03
IN4 0.01 0.47
IN6 0.05 1.71
STKCDSH 0.9670 2.93a
Adjusted R2 0.9671
a Significant t-statistics at the 1% level.
b Significant t-statistics at the 5% level.
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likelihood of SEO. In other words, the coefficient of AFTRTN suggests that the higher the after-
market return, the more likely the listed firm re-issue. This is consistent with the market
feedback hypothesis. Other two significant variables are Y96 and Y97, which shows that IPOs in
1996 and 1997 are more likely to issue SEOs than those in 1998. This is probably because IPOs
in 1996 and 1997 have longer time for SEOs than those in 1998 and thus have more
observations. Model 2 reports the results with the insignificant regressors removed.
The right censoring tobit regression examining H6 is presented in Table 8. The slope
coefficient estimate for IR is 0.04, with t=0.83. The sign of IR is opposite to the hypothesized
value and the t-statistic is insignificant. This again shows that the signaling hypothesis does not
hold. The coefficient for AFTRTN is negative (0.17) and statistically different from zero at the
1% level (t =4.42). This result indicates that firms that experience large price appreciation after
the IPO are likely to raise larger amounts of capital through seasoned equity issues. This is again
consistent with the market feedback hypothesis.
Table 8
Tobit regression for SEO and IPO underpricing
Dependent variable LNTIMESEO Coefficient t statistics
Explanatory variables Constant 7.44 6.98a
IR 0.04 0.83
AFTRTN 0.17 4.42a
LOG(IPOSZ) 0.01 0.21
Y96 0.38 4.18a
Y97 0.35 4.85a
IN2 0.09 0.83
IN3 0.40 1.34
IN4 0.05 0.62
IN6 0.28 2.49b
STKCDSH 0.00 0.07
Adjusted R2 0.1248
Total observations are 343 and right-censored observations are 128.
a Significant t-statistics at the 1% level.
b Significant t-statistics at the 5% level.
Table 7
Logit model for SEO
Dependent variable SEOD Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient t statistics Coefficient t statistics
Explanatory variables Constant 4.05 0.88 3.02 0.67
IR 0.07 0.40 0.07 0.40
AFTRTN 0.86 3.97a 0.81 3.89a
LOG(IPOSZ) 0.23 1.00 0.17 0.77
Y96 1.02 2.61a 0.98 2.53b
Y97 1.46 4.78a 1.39 4.69a
IN2 0.12 0.25
IN3 1.52 1.20
IN4 0.16 0.45
IN6 0.90 1.95
STKCDSH 0.16 0.67
215 observations with Dep=1, the total number of observations is 343.
a Significant t-statistics at the 1% level.
b Significant t-statistics at the 5% level.
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Model 1 of Table 9 reports the tobit regression estimates examining the relation between the
size of the seasoned offerings and the explanatory variables (Eq. (5)). The estimate (t-statistic) of
the slope coefficient for the variable IR is 0.02 (0.15), which indicates that the excess initial
returns in the IPOs are weak in explaining the relative SEO size. Thus, H7 is rejected. As in the
previous logit regression, we again find a positive (0.46) and significant (t =4.84) coefficient for
AFTRTN. Consistent with our previous findings, the market feedback hypothesis is supported.
The tobit regression also shows that the coefficient of IPOSZ is negative (0.37) and significant
(t=2.85) in explaining the relative SEO size. The coefficients (t-statistics) for the year dummy
variables Y96 and Y97 are 0.6 (2.67) and 0.72 (3.97), respectively. Another significant dummy
variable is IN6, suggesting that commercial firms raise smaller amount of capital in SEOs than
industrial firms. There is no statistical difference in the two stock exchanges.
To examine the relation among the stock-price response to the announcement of seasoned
equity offerings, underpricing and after-market returns, we use a sub-sample of 215 IPOs
with subsequent offerings to run the OLS regression. The results are presented in model 1 of
Table 10. The estimated coefficient for IR is positive, as expected, but statistically
insignificant (t =1.69). This indicates that underpricing the IPO does not significantly
mitigate the negative share-price response to a first seasoned equity offering. The estimate of
the coefficient for the variable AFTRTN is also not significantly different from zero. The rest
of the explanatory variables are insignificant. The adjusted R2 is 0.0089, which shows that
the regression has very weak explanatory power. This is not surprising in the Chinese market
because the seasoned equity offering news is normally leaked out long before the publication
of the SEO announcement. Usually, months before a re-issuance, a board meeting is held to
discuss the re-issuance decision and the meeting resolution is published the following day
after the meeting. Therefore, by the time the SEO prospectus is published, the SEO news is
not new and the stock price has already adjusted.
Model 1 of Table 10 examines only 215 firms with their first SEOs within 3 years of IPO.
The decision to make subsequent offerings is endogenous, which is not reflected in the cross
section estimates of model 1. Therefore, the estimator may be inconsistent as a result of
truncation bias. Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams (1990) derive consistent estimators using a
Table 9
Tobit regression for SEO size and IPO underpricing
Dependent variable SEOSZ/IPOSZ Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient t statistics Coefficient t statistics
Explanatory variables Constant 7.05 2.68a 7.08 2.69a
IR 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15
AFTRTN 0.46 4.84a 0.46 4.82a
LOG(IPOSZ) 0.37 2.85a 0.38 2.87a
Y96 0.60 2.67a 0.60 2.67a
Y97 0.72 3.97a 0.72 4.01a
IN2 0.25 0.88 0.23 0.83
IN3 1.04 1.41 1.06 1.43
IN4 0.05 0.25 0.06 0.32
IN6 0.54 2.00b 0.54 1.99b
STKCDSH 0.07 0.49
Adjusted R2 0.1440 0.1434
Total number of observations is 343, the number of left censored observations is 128.
a Significant t-statistics at the 1% level.
b Significant t-statistics at the 5% level.
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latent variable model. These estimators account for the presence of the potential truncation bias.
Michaely and Shaw (1994) use this method to detect the dividend announcement effect. We
adopt the same model to further examine H8.
Firstly, a probit regression is estimated as follows:
SEOD ¼ Zcþ e
where Z denotes the independent variables, which are IR, AFTRTN, ln(IPOSZ), Y96 and Y97.
They are related to the likelihood that a SEO will be issued. Then we calculate the Mill’s ratio
MILLSRATIO as u(Zc)/U(Zc), where u is the normal density function and U is the normal
cumulative distribution function.
By adding MILLSRATIO as one more explanatory variable into Eq. (6), consistent
parameters can be obtained. The estimation results are presented as model 2 in Table 10.
Similar to the results in model 1, the slope coefficients for IR and AFTRTN are insignificant.
This verifies the fact that more underpriced IPOs do not experience a less unfavorable price
reaction to SEO announcement than firms with less underpriced IPOs. Thus, H8 is rejected.
In summary, the relations between IPO and SEO activities in the Chinese market are mainly
caused by the after-market performances of stocks instead of the issuer’s signaling behavior. The
signaling hypothesis does not hold in the Chinese A-share market, while the market feedback
hypothesis is supported.
5. Conclusions
This study examines the degree of underpricing for 343 online fixed-price offerings from
November 1995 to December 1998. The initial return is on average 123.59%, which is much
Table 10
OLS regression for price reaction at the announcement of SEO
Dependent variable REACT Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient t statistics Coefficient t statistics
Explanatory variables Constant 0.35 1.98a 0.09 1.04
IR 0.01 1.69 0.00 1.59
AFTRTN 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.41
LNIPOSZ 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.94
Y96 0.02 1.61 0.01 0.82
Y97 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08
IN2 0.01 0.76 0.00 0.40
IN3 0.04 1.14 0.03 1.12
IN4 0.01 1.06 0.01 0.99
IN6 0.01 1.03 0.01 0.86
STKCDSH 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.37
LNTIMESEO 0.02 0.81 0.00 0.03
LNSEOSZ 0.02 1.54 0.00 0.44
SEOSZ/MKT 0.03 1.25 0.01 0.85
SEOPRC/TRDPRC 0.04 1.71 0.04 2.29a
MILLS RATIO 0.00 0.22
Adjusted R2 0.0089 0.0177
The number of observations is 215 for model 1 and 343 for model 2.
a Significant t-statistics at the 5% level.
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lower than the level in early 1990s reported in previous studies. This indicates that the efficiency
in the primary market has improved.
We investigate possible explanations for the level of underpricing, namely, the winner’s curse
hypothesis, the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis, and the signaling hypothesis. Consistent with the
winner’s curse hypothesis, after adjusting for rationing uninformed investors in the Chinese
market essentially break even. Using several proxies for ex ante uncertainty, we find that ex ante
uncertainty has very high explanatory power in explaining the Chinese IPO underpricing. We
also conclude that the signaling model does not hold in the Chinese market. Evidence shows that
the relations between IPO underpricing and SEO activities are caused by the market feedback
information. This is in contrast to the findings of Su and Fleisher (1999).
The main reasons for the Chinese A-share IPO underpricing are investor’s high level of ex ante
uncertainty about IPO value and the winner’s curse problem. As we have eliminated the possibility
of the signaling hypothesis, we conclude that the positive relation between ex ante uncertainty and
underpricing is evidence in support of the winner’s curse problem. Our results suggest that
reducing issuing firms’ ex ante uncertainty, such as through more information disclosure by IPO
firms, will help to ameliorate the winner’s curse problem and thereby lower the level of
underpricing. As individual investors in China becomemore knowledgeable and experienced, and
as CSRC frees up the IPO pricing ceiling and adopts book building mechanism after December
2004, the degree of IPO underpricing in the Chinese market is expected to be reduced.
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